tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30118288964823103882024-02-20T10:47:16.327-05:00The United States meets ChinaA discussion of Sino-U.S. relations in the new decade.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.comBlogger49125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-3733536192854258072010-04-28T16:13:00.003-04:002010-04-28T16:15:20.894-04:00Interior development updateI have uploaded an English version of the presentation I delivered last week concerning China's interior development and comprehensive national power. You can access it <a href="http://docs.google.com/leaf?id=0BzunpokQhj4HMGUxM2RhZjgtNDJkZC00YWQ3LWEzZjctYTZmMzQyY2I5ZWMw&hl=en">here</a>.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-17488878511517696122010-04-27T08:26:00.004-04:002010-04-27T08:26:00.565-04:00WWBD?I was randomly surfing the Moscow Times a couple of days ago and came across a story about Kyrgyzstan <a href="http://www.themoscowtimes.com/columns/1328/article/could-kyrgyzstan-cease-to-exist/404455.html">ceasing to exist</a>. Now for those of you out of the loop, about a week ago Kyrgyzstan's president was forced to flee to the south and then to Belarus because of a coup. He had been put into office by a previous coup, but became corrupt and didn't follow through on his promises. Not a resounding success for democracy in the region at all.<br /><br />Towards the end of the article it mentions that China may be willing to absorb the tiny nation of 5 million people. While there are some mineral resources in the offering, Beijing wouldn't want the additional responsibility. It has enough on its hands with Xinjiang, Tibet, and the central provinces that still lag behind the coastal areas by a substantial margin. One of my classmates who is familiar with Central Asian and Russian affairs dismisses the article as a Russian grab for the territory, instead saying it could go to Tajikistan.<br /><br />So in the future folks, when curious about what would Beijing do, follow these steps:<br /><br />1) Remove any biases (pro or con) you have about China<br />2) View it from the Chinese perspective<br />3) Think what would best fit their interests in developing (hint: it's stability)Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-26122073078304130402010-04-26T09:35:00.005-04:002010-04-26T10:02:51.923-04:00You can breathe nowFor any of you that were holding your breath in the hopes that China would approve of tough sanctions, you can breathe now. Not because China will support them though.<br /><br />From a <a href="http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/hefenghui/t679336.htm">press release </a>two weeks ago, the Chinese have made it clear (if it wasn't already), that targeted sanctions will not receive Beijing's support. Now you're probably saying "But what about the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/23/AR2010042302175.html">progress made at the UN</a>?" Well, sanctions are being developed, but they will fall far short of the targeted ones on petroleum exports that Washington wants. The only thing a UN Security Council resolution will do at this point will green light the tough sanctions Obama really wants for passage by Congress. And since the U.S. already has imposed several sanctions on the nuclear wannabe, it's doubtful that they'll work. I fully expect that Iran will become a nuclear state within my lifetime.<br /><br />I won't claim to be an expert on Iranian affairs, but the nuclear issue seems to be the only thing Western countries are desperate to talk to Iran about. Moreover, rights to nuclear technology present a rally around-the-flag topic that Tehran can use to remain in power. Seems to me that it might be worthwhile to try to buy off Iran as opposed to whacking it with sanctions. Some people may resent rewarding Iran for its negative behavior, but sanctioning Iran is a lot like withholding a child's allowance until they behave. Sometimes it takes corporal punishment. However, no country (with the exception of Israel) is advocating a military strike.<br /><br />I'll close off with a general criticism of sanctions. In order for sanctions to be effective, the targeted country needs to know what it should do to have them terminated. If one looks at UN Security Council <a href="http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=S/RES/1737%282006%29&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC">resolution 1737</a>, it says that Iran must halt all R&D on nuclear technology and enrichment. Considering that Iran needs alternative sources for energy production because of the sanctions currently placed on it, this is asking A LOT. No wonder Iran is pursuing what is in its interests.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-76265644021134639782010-04-26T08:55:00.000-04:002010-04-26T08:55:00.339-04:00Gotta have a sense of humorXinhua has an article covering Obama's decision to pursue the development of a missile that can hit any target on the planet within an hour. You can see it <a href="http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-04/26/c_1256104.htm">here</a>. Now there has been a fair amount of criticism for his decision, as seen in the <a href="http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-04/26/c_1256104.htm">Huff Post</a> and <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/23/global_strikeout">Foreign Policy</a>.<br /><br />What made me chuckle was the picture chosen for the piece: Obama accepting the Nobel Peace Prize at Oslo. Regardless of one's position on the new missile, you gotta hand it to the Chinese for picking the right picture.<br /><br />So what does this mean for Sino-US relations? In the greater scheme of things, very little. The Chinese military is already modernizing its forces while the US remains anxious about China's military intentions. This program, if it goes forward, will only serve the purpose of providing more evidence for those voices in China that view the US as a threat.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-46075231373370564942010-04-25T13:52:00.003-04:002010-04-25T14:24:29.216-04:00Hypocrisy, what is it good for?This morning I was reading my e-mail and among the unread was my NY Times alert for anything related to China. I was struck by the headline for a China-related piece which reads "<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/25/world/africa/25niger.html?pagewanted=1&tntemail1=y&emc=tnt">In Niger, China Fortifies Its Reputation as Africa's Investor</a>".<br /><br />The article lambastes China for continuing its commercial contracts in Niger after a military coup overthrew autocratic Nigerien President Mamadou Tandja. It succinctly sums up the relationship between Tandja and China when it states:<br /><br />"The Chinese ambassador had instant entree to Mr. Tandja’s whitewashed presidential palace, at all hours, people close to the former government said; Chinese executives dealt directly with the presidency, bypassing ministers; and Mr. Tandja’s son Ousmane was firmly ensconced as his country’s “commercial attaché” in China, serving as a go-between."<br /><br />So what coverage has the NYT given to any Western countries operating in Niger? As far as I can tell, <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/niger/index.html">absolutely none</a>. Given that <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE63G0A120100417">French</a> and <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTOE63F05F20100418">South Korean</a> companies are continuing their operations in Niger despite the seizure of power, I would expect some outrage from the NYT, but I am disappointed. But hey, even the U.S. State Department has <a href="http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2010/137165.htm">nothing to say on the matter</a>.<br /><br />Which leaves me even more confused over the NYT's outrage about China's behavior in Niger. To borrow from a line from Hamlet, "The lady doth protest too much, methinks".Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-64197752385170502952010-04-24T10:19:00.003-04:002010-04-24T19:42:50.293-04:00Facts & Figures<a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/think_again_chinas_military">Foreign policy</a> has a good article on China's military. I highly recommend the last page where it mentions <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/think_again_chinas_military?page=0,6">global aspirations</a>. Of course, there's always the U.S. Department of Defense's <a href="http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf">report on China's military power</a> if you're up for more. Both sources will put Kaplan's assessment of China in greater perspective.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-16962232481816407482010-04-23T11:32:00.005-04:002010-04-23T13:08:09.332-04:00Things to come?I just finished digesting an op-ed piece I read in the <a href="http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/sub/views/story/0,4574,382536,00.html">Business Times</a> out of Singapore. It describes how lucky China is to be at the center of geopolitics now and going forward, as its development will fundamentally change the international landscape. While I could quibble with that, instead I'll turn to the author's (Robert Kaplan) projections on how the U.S. will be impacted.<br /><br />Kaplan in his piece towards the bottom mentions Taiwan as follows:<br /><br /><span style=";font-family:Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12px;" >"Beijing is also preparing to envelop Taiwan not just militarily, but also economically and socially. How this comes about will be pivotal for the future of great-power politics in the region. If the US simply abandons Taiwan to Beijing, then Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and other US allies in the Pacific Ocean will begin to doubt the strength of Washington's commitments."<br /><br /></span>While I don't disagree that Beijing is trying to isolate Taiwan, it's a far stretch to say that the U.S. will simply abandon Taiwan in the future. There is still substantial support for the island-bound democracy in Congress. Furthermore, China could be very different politically if and when Taiwan becomes part of the PRC. From my own perspective, China would only attack Taiwan when it felt that its economic development was complete and it could withstand any economic blowback from conflict in the Taiwan Strait. That won't happen for at least four decades. A lot can happen between now and 2050.<br /><br />Kaplan then signs off with:<br /><br /><span style=";font-family:Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12px;" >"Still, the very fact of China's rising economic and military power will exacerbate US-Chinese tensions in the years ahead. To paraphrase the political scientist John Mearsheimer, the US, the hegemon of the Western Hemisphere, will try to prevent China from becoming the hegemon of much of the Eastern Hemisphere. This could be the signal drama of the age."<br /><br /></span> If that were true, then shouldn't the U.S. just attack China now? You know, follow through with preventative war? Kaplan's basically saying that China's continued development is a zero-sum game for the U.S. I don't buy that at all given the economic relationship. Americans are able to consume inexpensive goods from China in a time of economic difficulty. I do not disagree with Kaplan that China's military modernization will cause angst in Washington, but it is very premature to even project armed conflict between the U.S. and China.<br /><br />Admin note: Finals are fast approaching. As such, don't expect a lot of posts this coming week. Will be back to normal after May 3rd.<br /><span style=";font-family:Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12px;" ><span style="font-family:arial;"></span></span><span style=";font-family:Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12px;" ><blockquote></blockquote></span>Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-25104380757390535382010-04-22T09:03:00.005-04:002010-04-22T09:28:22.069-04:00Comparatively weakYesterday I was quite busy preparing a presentation for my class on China's political economy. I've made it<a href="http://docs.google.com/leaf?id=0BzunpokQhj4HZTI3NTYzOWQtMzkyZi00MWU2LThmYWEtZGY0ZGQwMWUwYjU0&hl=en"> available online</a>, although it's in Chinese. I'll translate it and post an English version sometime over the weekend.<br /><br />The topic of the presentation centered on why the development of China's interior is important as a source of comprehensive national power (<a href="http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=3&ved=0CBQQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.irchina.org%2Fen%2Fpdf%2Fhag.pdf&ei=GUnQS8vwJIL6lwe9y43IDw&usg=AFQjCNECW2cg-vnWhVbh1zXTgKEwtPURxw&sig2=PmeDnUfaezdjTMIopdRGTQ">综合国力, CNP</a>). As opposed to focusing on hard or soft power, Chinese scholars have combined the two with a new capability called coordinating power (协调能力). While hard power is measured in military and economic terms and soft power stemming from cultural attractiveness, coordinating power gauges a government's ability to channel resources and deal with problems. Given modern China's history, this isn't an entirely surprising addition.<br /><br />Economic development of the interior is critical. From what I've read in the Chinese press and scholarly writings, China's CNP hinges on being able to bring development to the entire country, not just selected areas on the coast. In the presentation I chose Qinghai province to get a sense of its progress since economic reforms were first initiated in the 1980s. I was quite surprised to see annual income rise in tandem with a population, as the Solow economic model and empirical results show that high growth in population negatively impacts income growth (e.g. the more people you have, the smaller the slice of the pie each person gets). However Qinghai's experience goes against the grain. Turns out that the companies in operation were on the secondary and tertiary levels of the value chain, meaning higher incomes for employees.<br /><br />So what do I mean by today's title? Quite simply that a segment China's academic community looks at the whole of China and other states when measuring strength. It isn't enough to have a strong military or economy, a state also needs an efficient government and domestic stability. From their 30,000 foot level, these Chinese scholars see their country as a comparatively weak country. While their assessment may be accurate today, it will most likely be dated come twenty years.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-78449350982960175032010-04-19T09:52:00.005-04:002010-04-19T09:52:00.475-04:00Walk, don't runI can't help but be impressed with The Economist. We all know it's an excellent news source, but Kal certainly gets his point across very well with his <a href="http://www.economist.com/daily/kallery/displayStory.cfm?story_id=15922352&source=features_box4">latest piece</a>. He nails it right on the head when China says there are no clear options in response to Iran's nuclear program. Why you ask?<br /><br />The last thing China wants to do is support sanctions tough enough to bring down the Iranian government. After all, it was only last June when opposition protesters were shouting death to Russia and China. Beijing can work with the current regime in Tehran and doesn't want a change in management. Now some people are suggesting that China's commercial interests are dictating its position on Iran. I'm quite skeptical about economics playing significant a role, as trade in 2009 between China and Iran amounted to only $15 billion, while almost $1 trillion between the U.S. and EU combined. Those numbers alone would suggest China would be better off cooperating.<br /><br />So does Beijing want Iran to have nuclear weapons? Not if it destabilizes the region. Saudi Arabia and the other countries in the region certainly don't want their Iranian neighbor to have nuclear weapons and would have little problem increasing deliveries to the West at China's expense if they felt it was to blame. The issue at hand though is China likes the status quo - it gets everything it needs from the world to focus on its domestic development. To agree to sanctions would disturb the balance China enjoys. As Kal's piece points out, there aren't any clear options <span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">for China</span> that satisfies the West's demands and allow it to focus on development. Until such an option presents itself, the Chinese government will drag its feet.<br /><br />P.S.<br /><br />The same bottom line can be applied to China's position on North Korea. The Chinese government would rather allow things to progress naturally rather than take any action that carries more risk than reward.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-58806308587679809742010-04-16T11:49:00.000-04:002010-04-15T23:52:54.285-04:00Tibetan economicsNo, it isn't a new form of economics. Instead it's the subject of a story on The Economist about <a href="http://www.economist.com/diversions/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15389252">economic development in Tibet.</a> I think it's definitely worth a read so you can appreciate why the Chinese government wants to develop the region.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-37309733749233821402010-04-14T09:02:00.000-04:002010-04-14T09:02:00.262-04:00The soft side of ChinaIn 1990 a well-known political scientist, Joseph Nye, coined the term "soft power." For those of you unfamiliar with the term, soft power is when other countries want what another country wants. In regards to China, soft power would be reflected when other countries want the same thing China wants. No need to threaten or persuade. It's similar to a person having Golden Retriever (without a wagging tail), where a Golden is up to doing anything its owner wants to do (especially playing fetch or eating).<br /><br />This "soft power" is different from military or economic power (otherwise known as "hard power") in that its sources are cultural attractiveness, political ideology, and activity abroad. Put simply, if other countries like the culture and have good feelings about China, then China will have a lot of soft power. The problem is that measuring soft power is really hard. How does one quantify or qualify cultural attractiveness? The number of movies, pop songs, or Nobel prize awards? Using any of those doesn't quite do the trick, as we don't know how one more movie, pop song, or Nobel prize enhances a country's soft power.<br /><br />That all said, people are making a big deal about <a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/10715/">China's "soft power</a>." I'm really skeptical on the subject, especially when everyone agrees that the source of soft power is the attractiveness of culture to foreign audiences; it isn't something that a state can really promote. After all, when you know that a government is trying to shape your opinion, you're more likely to believe the exact opposite of what it is saying. So when I see something like CFR's article on China's soft power, I cringe.<span style="font-style: italic;"></span> It details China's commercial diplomacy more than anything else. Sure, people in Southeast Asia and Pakistan have favorable views of China now, but Southeast Asia definitely has concerns about China in the future. Soft power, like any other type of power, comes and goes. Moreover, because soft power's primary source is culture, it takes a while (say more than a generation) to actually see any payoff. China just really started to focus on soft power in 2006. Little too early to talk about its soft power from my perspective.<br /><br />In the Western world (including South Korea and Japan), there is still a lot of anxiety surrounding China's intentions. Throw Tiananmen Square and Tibet on top of China's increasing military capabilities and you have a recipe for almost continual suspicion of China. For all the talk about China's "soft power" there really isn't much to it.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-19223278726178176352010-04-12T08:51:00.001-04:002010-04-12T08:51:00.220-04:00The U.S. is still the top dogForeign Policy is running an article that I think illustrates <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/09/guess_whos_coming_to_dinner">American preeminence</a> in the international community. Looking at the list of the 40+ countries and what they want from the United States, it is hard to believe <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/id/234965">speculation</a> that United States has suffered from a loss of stature within the international community.<br /><br />My logic (and it may be flawed), is that if the United States was viewed by other states as weaker and not a useful partner (or means) in pursuit of their goals, then fewer countries would be in attendance. Moreover, one wouldn't see the diversity of "wants" when the foreign dignitaries get their time with American officials. Compare this to when foreign officials go to China, <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/">economics</a> tends to be the overriding topic of discussion.<br /><br />However, my logic applies as long as the current international system remains in place. Now how long that will be is a topic of frequent debate within political science, meaning that there is no firm answer. The problem in defining a specific period of time in which another state (read China) could be the dominant power within an international system is that what we know today is more defined than ever before in history. In no time prior to post-WWII has the international community had the breadth and depth of cooperation it has today. One only needs to look at the United Nations, World Bank, IMF, and the G20 to gain a sense of the interdependency. The United States lies at the heart of each of those bodies (the G20 less so than the other 3). For China to edge the United States out of its supremacy would be no small feat and would require lots of time (50+ years). It could be even longer if the international community does not share the same values of China.<br /><br />So for those of you who doubt American influence, sorry to pop your bubble of depression (or joy depending on your feelings of American supremacy). The world still revolves around the U.S.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-77730808660264098582010-04-09T09:18:00.000-04:002010-04-09T09:18:00.719-04:00Update on China-Taiwan FTALooks like Taiwan and China will be signing an FTA this June according to <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/01/AR2010040100764.html">The Washington Post</a>. I look forward to reading the document, as whatever wording is used to address Beijing and Taipei could possibly be used in a future peace treaty between the two parties.<br /><br />Besides a warming of relations with Beijing, the FTA will also <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62P19A20100326">open doors to similar agreements with other countries</a>, notably Asean members. The United States will want to ink one as well, knowing that Beijing won't protest since it signed one with Taipei first. If I was an American government official, I'd certainly want to get it done within a couple of years to maintain (if not increase) trade and hence American influence in Taiwan. Why do you ask?<br /><br />Quite simply the China-Taiwan FTA will either maintain or increase Taiwan's dependency on Chinese trade, potentially providing Beijing with additional leverage over the island. The United States may not yet be ready for Taiwan to assume a closer orbit around the mainland, therefore having an FTA with Taipei would at the very least maintain the status quo.<br /><br />Is that a good policy? Depends on who you ask. However the U.S. government will find it increasingly difficult over time to maintain the status quo, especially considering China's military modernization. The U.S. would be hard pressed to sell F-18s or nuclear submarines to the island, which are fast becoming the most basic armaments in the U.S. military. Economically, China is likely to maintain annual GDP growth over 8% for the next several years and could easily show favoritism to Taiwanese companies in an effort to limit America's options.<br /><br />I understand that kicking the can is always the preferable policy decision when confronting lose-lose scenarios. However I can't help but wonder if U.S. Taiwan policy will soon face a rather large wall.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-19074780256634075152010-04-08T09:53:00.000-04:002010-04-08T09:53:00.083-04:00Singing in the StraitWhile this kid can sing well, I highly doubt that the song will become Taiwan's policy towards China any time soon.<br /><br /><object height="385" width="480"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/-3-p_4z6FiM&hl=en_US&fs=1&rel=0"><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/-3-p_4z6FiM&hl=en_US&fs=1&rel=0" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" height="385" width="480"></embed></object>Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-8509381008215217522010-04-07T08:30:00.000-04:002010-04-07T08:30:01.019-04:00Hu goes to WashingtonChinese President Hu Jintao will be in Washington shortly to discuss a wide range of issues with Obama. Politico has a good piece on the occasion, so I refer you all to it <a href="http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/35458.html">here</a> as opposed to detailing it myself.<br /><br />I'm looking forward to the statements issued during the time that Hu is in the U.S., as they'll provide some idea of where the PRC stands on things. What will be most interesting in my opinion is the <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-04/01/c_13234304.htm">disarmament discussions</a>, as the PRC is rapidly increasing its nuclear arsenal (may have 700 nuclear missiles by 2020, compared to the 1,700 held by the U.S.). Moreover, Hu's comments on the issue will solidify the Chinese position on Iran's nuclear program.<br /><br />Break out your Chinese green tea and stay tuned!Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-3688393788476430332010-04-06T09:41:00.000-04:002010-04-06T09:41:00.244-04:00Bought in ChinaThe Economist in this week's issue discusses what it sees as a <a href="http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displayStory.cfm?story_id=15793036">transformation in American buying</a> habits. If its predictions are correct, that Americans will consume less and produce more for global markets, Chinese companies will no doubt experience some ripple effects. The Economist points out that currently strong American exporters are more likely to benefit from a lower dollar and increased consumption. So what changes can one predict in regards to Sino-US trade?<br /><br />Data from the <a href="http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2010">U.S. Census Bureau</a> illustrates the decline in bilateral trade that has taken place up to this point in time. The trade imbalance for 2009 was similar to that in 2006, dropping from a high of $268 billion in 2008 to $226 billion. If the U.S. buys less and the Chinese buy more (assuming the Chinese central bank allows the Yuan to appreciate in value), then the gap could shrink even more.<br /><br />This partly why some <a href="http://www.economist.com/world/united-states/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15819107&source=most_commented">American politicians</a> are calling on the Chinese government to allow their currency to gain in value. If the Yuan grows stronger against the dollar, Chinese exports are more expensive in the U.S., while American goods in China are cheaper. However, if the Yuan's value stagnates, then the American deficit with China will only decrease as a result of lower American consumption of Chinese goods.<br /><br />There are <a href="http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/04/the_us_goes_all_in_on_the_g_20">some academics</a> who think that China will relax its hold on the RMB and allow it to gain in value. While such predictions may pan out, I'm fairly certain that the Chinese will not allow their currency to appreciate as much as American politicians and others in the international community would like. The general consensus is that the RMB is undervalued by 25%. I'll venture to say that the Chinese central bank will allow 5%-10% over the course of the next year. Again, no where near where people would like, but it's a start.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-47126987579734433522010-04-05T15:19:00.002-04:002010-04-05T15:19:00.063-04:00More readingBelow are some more books that I think are worth reading for those of you who would like to gain more insight about the PRC and its foreign relations.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security</span> by Avery Goldstein<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics</span> edited by Robert Ross and Zhu Feng (Includes chapters on how Japan, South Korea, and India each view China's development.)<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics</span> by Bobo LoChrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-89315421945147918372010-04-05T09:07:00.002-04:002010-04-05T09:08:42.861-04:00Plug for FletcherJust couldn't help but <a href="http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2010/04/05/tufts_project_delivered_aid_to_quake_victims/">advertise this project at my school</a>. Fletcher is full of talented people.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-66277487131862823072010-04-05T08:30:00.003-04:002010-04-05T08:54:14.904-04:00"Democracy" in China, Part IIIFew people outside of China have ever read the words of Mao Zedong. From my perspective this only contributes to the ignorance surrounding the CCP's position on Western democracy and continued tensions between the West and the PRC.<br /><br />As such it is only appropriate to briefly discuss Mao's position on democracy, as his thought still <a href="http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html">guides the CCP</a>. <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_65.htm">In his speech on democracy</a>, Mao clearly outlines why the Chinese people could not accept Western democracy. In the fourth and fifth paragraphs, he describes the Chinese people's experience with Western democracy and its ultimate failure because it excluded so many of the Chinese people. Moreover, despite such strong yearning to become modern through Western ideals, the Western powers (Europe, the U.S., Japan, and Russia), were still treating China as a backward state, demanding commercial contracts for railroads and banking. They also still clung to their spheres of influence where Chinese law had no power.<br /><br />In the fifth paragraph, Mao describes that socialism will abolish classes in society, reflecting the growing disparity between the rich and poor. Now one could argue that such a disparity always existed in China, however socialist philosophy had never entered the Chinese psyche before.<br /><br />In the paragraph concerning abolishing state power (towards the end), Mao is quite honest stating that anyone who opposes the socialist revolution in China will not be treated kindly. Only those considered "the people" will be treated with benevolence. Recognizing that purging political threats has been a mainstay throughout the Republic of China under Yuan Shikai and Chiang Kai-shek (who hunted the CCP), this position cannot come as a surprise.<br /><br />To sum up, Mao and the modern day CCP leadership have no taste for Western democracy. Not only is it viewed as corrupt (ironic considering that no government is free of corruption), but also because "democracy" in China is associated with chaos, civil strife, and weakness. The Republic of China was never able to stand on its own two feet and govern the entire territory of China (which in and of itself is a subject of debate). As such Western calls for liberalization in Chinese politics will fall of deaf ears in Beijing for the time being.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-6130910558108468132010-03-25T05:12:00.005-04:002010-04-01T14:33:11.277-04:00"Democracy" in China, Part IIToday I'll be talking about Chiang Kai-shek (referred to as Jiang Jieshi from time to time by Beijing). While several American administrations and elements of the American public portrayed him as a Chinese George Washington, he was more like Benito Mussolini.<br /><br />Chiang Kai-shek was born to a merchant family but like most people from his class studied in Japan, in his case at a military academy for two years. Upon his return to China (which was under the administration of Yuan Shikai), Chiang became involved with various crime organizations and eventually the Nationalist Party (led by Sun Yatsen).<br /><br />Eventually Chiang would assume leadership of the Republic of China after the government moved to the south. His style of government really can be compared to fascism, as he utilized secret police and believed that the people and state should be of one mission. Far from promoting democracy, he hunted down political opponents (even the Chinese Communist Party prior to the Nationalist "defeat"in 1949).<br /><br />Once in Taiwan, Chiang never released his grip. He imposed martial law on the island, which remained in place until the late 1980s when his son would lift it. One of my teachers remembers studying in Taiwan during the 1970s and clearly recalls the "political commissar" stationed in the dorm.<br /><br />Tune in over the weekend for Mao's thoughts on democracy.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-60517246904797567792010-03-23T22:20:00.005-04:002010-03-23T22:50:17.476-04:00"Democracy" in China, Part ISorry about the downtime. A little after I posted last Tuesday, I spilled soda on my laptop and promptly ruined it. Fortunately I back everything up and am now up and running again.<br /><br />So what do I mean by "democracy"? More or less the form of government in the United States, otherwise known as a constitutional republic. So let's be clear that when politicians and citizens call for "democracy" in the PRC, they are really talking about instituting a republican form of government.<br /><br />The first modern appearance of republican government in China was the establishment of the Republic of China. It was established in Beijing on January 1, 1912 after the last emperor of China was forced out. The Republic of China still exists, although on the island of Taiwan since 1949. Unfortunately it got off to a bad start from which it never recovered, as a general named Yuan Shikai was its first president.<br /><br />Yuan began his career by serving in the Qing imperial army and rose through the ranks. He was part of the clique that brought an end to period known as the 100 days of reform, during which Emperor Guangxu tried to usher in reforms to transform the Chinese empire into a constitutional monarchy (think Great Britain). Positive sign, right?<br /><br />The Chinese can't be blamed. In fact, Yuan was THE muscle in China. He had the largest and most modern army in China at the time. So despite the fact that Sun Yatsen should have been president by all accounts, the person with the largest amount of force assumed the position.<br /><br />My next post will discuss Chiang Kai-shek (or Jiang Jieshi in pinyin). While I recognize that this is skipping a few years, I'm sticking the milestones in China's experiments with less authoritarian forms of government. After that, I'll delve into what Mao Zedong's thoughts were on democracy. For a good review on this material, John Spence's book "The Search for Modern China" is an excellent resource.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-51880795259908117022010-03-16T13:21:00.003-04:002010-03-16T13:25:41.649-04:00Heads upWow, has it really been the 3rd since my last post? Sorry about that. I had the pleasure of hosting my sister last week.<br /><br />However, I have been thinking about what my posts will be. I am putting together a multi-post series concerning democracy in the PRC. Much has been made about it, and I've referred to it in a couple of previous posts. As such, it only makes sense to spend a little more time discussing Chinese democracy's historical roots and evolution. Expect the first post to be uploaded tomorrow on the 17th.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-53119198618711944312010-03-03T08:40:00.000-05:002010-03-03T08:40:00.524-05:00Growing painsDeng Xiaoping when he was in power instructed his successors to focus on development and not take a lead in global affairs. This was sound advice at the time, as China was not nearly as developed as it is now. Deng was no doubt influenced by the foreign policy carried out by Mao during the 1960s, where Mao was making a grab for leading the global socialist movement and not making many friends because of it.<br /><br />Since Deng's passing in 1997, the PRC leadership has followed Deng's advice amazingly well, hardly straying from it. However, it has led to the growing disenfranchisement within the international community, particularly in Europe and the United States. The problem is that those two powers want the PRC to play a larger role in international affairs, as seen at Copenhagen, Iran, and North Korea. However, with the exception of North Korea, the PRC has shown little interest in doing anything that would go against Deng's sage advice.<br /><br />The CCP is still narrowly focused on developing China, which is not totally unreasonable. However, the PRC's rise will be greeted with continued less enthusiasm the longer it takes the CCP to develop a foreign policy that is conducive to both development and active foreign diplomacy. Will it be difficult? Absolutely, we're seeing it right now. Can the CCP pull it off? No doubt about it. It'll just take some time.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-69143685176037385892010-03-01T10:27:00.002-05:002010-03-01T10:31:25.548-05:00China's claimsThe Economist has an excellent three minute video on China's territorial claims. It covers the expansion of China's dynasties over the centuries and delves into the modern claims. If any one dispute is of interest, let me know and I'll write something up about it.<br /><br /><iframe src="http://video.economist.com/linking/index.jsp?skin=oneclip&ehv=http://audiovideo.economist.com/&fr_story=45b8d0aeabdf0a9f9aad886302c95430afeff75a&rf=ev&hl=true" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" frameborder="0" height="336" scrolling="no" width="402"></iframe>Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3011828896482310388.post-53333866945981492872010-03-01T09:02:00.001-05:002010-03-01T09:02:00.910-05:00One step closerReuters India is reporting that the KMT has <a href="http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-46527820100227">successfully prevented</a> the potential free trade agreement with the PRC from being put to a public vote. The Taiwan opposition party (known as the Democratic Progressive Party, DPP for short), was trying to get the Taiwan public to vote on it in hopes of getting it killed. Based from what <a href="http://usmeetschina.blogspot.com/2010/01/left-out-in-cold.html">I've said</a> on the importance on such an agreement, why would the DPP want that?<br /><br />The DPP is increasingly becoming the party associated with Taiwan independence. Consequently, any agreement with the mainland is viewed by the party as surrendering Taiwanese sovereignty. From my perspective this is an instance of where blind ideology could lead to disaster. If the DPP were able to get the agreement put to a public vote and it was voted down, then Taiwan would suffer severely on the economic front. Such an event would have dramatic consequences for the island, as its economic prosperity is what partly allows it to maintain its current status (read not under Beijing's control). The KMT recognizes the basic fact that Taiwan's economic prosperity is key to its national security. As such, signing an FTA with the PRC not jeopardize Taiwan's status, it will protect it.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17114718781467202385noreply@blogger.com0