Interior development update

I have uploaded an English version of the presentation I delivered last week concerning China's interior development and comprehensive national power. You can access it here.

WWBD?

I was randomly surfing the Moscow Times a couple of days ago and came across a story about Kyrgyzstan ceasing to exist. Now for those of you out of the loop, about a week ago Kyrgyzstan's president was forced to flee to the south and then to Belarus because of a coup. He had been put into office by a previous coup, but became corrupt and didn't follow through on his promises. Not a resounding success for democracy in the region at all.

Towards the end of the article it mentions that China may be willing to absorb the tiny nation of 5 million people. While there are some mineral resources in the offering, Beijing wouldn't want the additional responsibility. It has enough on its hands with Xinjiang, Tibet, and the central provinces that still lag behind the coastal areas by a substantial margin. One of my classmates who is familiar with Central Asian and Russian affairs dismisses the article as a Russian grab for the territory, instead saying it could go to Tajikistan.

So in the future folks, when curious about what would Beijing do, follow these steps:

1) Remove any biases (pro or con) you have about China
2) View it from the Chinese perspective
3) Think what would best fit their interests in developing (hint: it's stability)

The soft side of China

In 1990 a well-known political scientist, Joseph Nye, coined the term "soft power." For those of you unfamiliar with the term, soft power is when other countries want what another country wants. In regards to China, soft power would be reflected when other countries want the same thing China wants. No need to threaten or persuade. It's similar to a person having Golden Retriever (without a wagging tail), where a Golden is up to doing anything its owner wants to do (especially playing fetch or eating).

This "soft power" is different from military or economic power (otherwise known as "hard power") in that its sources are cultural attractiveness, political ideology, and activity abroad. Put simply, if other countries like the culture and have good feelings about China, then China will have a lot of soft power. The problem is that measuring soft power is really hard. How does one quantify or qualify cultural attractiveness? The number of movies, pop songs, or Nobel prize awards? Using any of those doesn't quite do the trick, as we don't know how one more movie, pop song, or Nobel prize enhances a country's soft power.

That all said, people are making a big deal about China's "soft power." I'm really skeptical on the subject, especially when everyone agrees that the source of soft power is the attractiveness of culture to foreign audiences; it isn't something that a state can really promote. After all, when you know that a government is trying to shape your opinion, you're more likely to believe the exact opposite of what it is saying. So when I see something like CFR's article on China's soft power, I cringe. It details China's commercial diplomacy more than anything else. Sure, people in Southeast Asia and Pakistan have favorable views of China now, but Southeast Asia definitely has concerns about China in the future. Soft power, like any other type of power, comes and goes. Moreover, because soft power's primary source is culture, it takes a while (say more than a generation) to actually see any payoff. China just really started to focus on soft power in 2006. Little too early to talk about its soft power from my perspective.

In the Western world (including South Korea and Japan), there is still a lot of anxiety surrounding China's intentions. Throw Tiananmen Square and Tibet on top of China's increasing military capabilities and you have a recipe for almost continual suspicion of China. For all the talk about China's "soft power" there really isn't much to it.

The U.S. is still the top dog

Foreign Policy is running an article that I think illustrates American preeminence in the international community. Looking at the list of the 40+ countries and what they want from the United States, it is hard to believe speculation that United States has suffered from a loss of stature within the international community.

My logic (and it may be flawed), is that if the United States was viewed by other states as weaker and not a useful partner (or means) in pursuit of their goals, then fewer countries would be in attendance. Moreover, one wouldn't see the diversity of "wants" when the foreign dignitaries get their time with American officials. Compare this to when foreign officials go to China, economics tends to be the overriding topic of discussion.

However, my logic applies as long as the current international system remains in place. Now how long that will be is a topic of frequent debate within political science, meaning that there is no firm answer. The problem in defining a specific period of time in which another state (read China) could be the dominant power within an international system is that what we know today is more defined than ever before in history. In no time prior to post-WWII has the international community had the breadth and depth of cooperation it has today. One only needs to look at the United Nations, World Bank, IMF, and the G20 to gain a sense of the interdependency. The United States lies at the heart of each of those bodies (the G20 less so than the other 3). For China to edge the United States out of its supremacy would be no small feat and would require lots of time (50+ years). It could be even longer if the international community does not share the same values of China.

So for those of you who doubt American influence, sorry to pop your bubble of depression (or joy depending on your feelings of American supremacy). The world still revolves around the U.S.

More reading

Below are some more books that I think are worth reading for those of you who would like to gain more insight about the PRC and its foreign relations.

Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security by Avery Goldstein

China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics edited by Robert Ross and Zhu Feng (Includes chapters on how Japan, South Korea, and India each view China's development.)

Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics by Bobo Lo

Growing pains

Deng Xiaoping when he was in power instructed his successors to focus on development and not take a lead in global affairs. This was sound advice at the time, as China was not nearly as developed as it is now. Deng was no doubt influenced by the foreign policy carried out by Mao during the 1960s, where Mao was making a grab for leading the global socialist movement and not making many friends because of it.

Since Deng's passing in 1997, the PRC leadership has followed Deng's advice amazingly well, hardly straying from it. However, it has led to the growing disenfranchisement within the international community, particularly in Europe and the United States. The problem is that those two powers want the PRC to play a larger role in international affairs, as seen at Copenhagen, Iran, and North Korea. However, with the exception of North Korea, the PRC has shown little interest in doing anything that would go against Deng's sage advice.

The CCP is still narrowly focused on developing China, which is not totally unreasonable. However, the PRC's rise will be greeted with continued less enthusiasm the longer it takes the CCP to develop a foreign policy that is conducive to both development and active foreign diplomacy. Will it be difficult? Absolutely, we're seeing it right now. Can the CCP pull it off? No doubt about it. It'll just take some time.