Comparatively weak

Yesterday I was quite busy preparing a presentation for my class on China's political economy. I've made it available online, although it's in Chinese. I'll translate it and post an English version sometime over the weekend.

The topic of the presentation centered on why the development of China's interior is important as a source of comprehensive national power (综合国力, CNP). As opposed to focusing on hard or soft power, Chinese scholars have combined the two with a new capability called coordinating power (协调能力). While hard power is measured in military and economic terms and soft power stemming from cultural attractiveness, coordinating power gauges a government's ability to channel resources and deal with problems. Given modern China's history, this isn't an entirely surprising addition.

Economic development of the interior is critical. From what I've read in the Chinese press and scholarly writings, China's CNP hinges on being able to bring development to the entire country, not just selected areas on the coast. In the presentation I chose Qinghai province to get a sense of its progress since economic reforms were first initiated in the 1980s. I was quite surprised to see annual income rise in tandem with a population, as the Solow economic model and empirical results show that high growth in population negatively impacts income growth (e.g. the more people you have, the smaller the slice of the pie each person gets). However Qinghai's experience goes against the grain. Turns out that the companies in operation were on the secondary and tertiary levels of the value chain, meaning higher incomes for employees.

So what do I mean by today's title? Quite simply that a segment China's academic community looks at the whole of China and other states when measuring strength. It isn't enough to have a strong military or economy, a state also needs an efficient government and domestic stability. From their 30,000 foot level, these Chinese scholars see their country as a comparatively weak country. While their assessment may be accurate today, it will most likely be dated come twenty years.

Walk, don't run

I can't help but be impressed with The Economist. We all know it's an excellent news source, but Kal certainly gets his point across very well with his latest piece. He nails it right on the head when China says there are no clear options in response to Iran's nuclear program. Why you ask?

The last thing China wants to do is support sanctions tough enough to bring down the Iranian government. After all, it was only last June when opposition protesters were shouting death to Russia and China. Beijing can work with the current regime in Tehran and doesn't want a change in management. Now some people are suggesting that China's commercial interests are dictating its position on Iran. I'm quite skeptical about economics playing significant a role, as trade in 2009 between China and Iran amounted to only $15 billion, while almost $1 trillion between the U.S. and EU combined. Those numbers alone would suggest China would be better off cooperating.

So does Beijing want Iran to have nuclear weapons? Not if it destabilizes the region. Saudi Arabia and the other countries in the region certainly don't want their Iranian neighbor to have nuclear weapons and would have little problem increasing deliveries to the West at China's expense if they felt it was to blame. The issue at hand though is China likes the status quo - it gets everything it needs from the world to focus on its domestic development. To agree to sanctions would disturb the balance China enjoys. As Kal's piece points out, there aren't any clear options for China that satisfies the West's demands and allow it to focus on development. Until such an option presents itself, the Chinese government will drag its feet.

P.S.

The same bottom line can be applied to China's position on North Korea. The Chinese government would rather allow things to progress naturally rather than take any action that carries more risk than reward.

Tibetan economics

No, it isn't a new form of economics. Instead it's the subject of a story on The Economist about economic development in Tibet. I think it's definitely worth a read so you can appreciate why the Chinese government wants to develop the region.

The soft side of China

In 1990 a well-known political scientist, Joseph Nye, coined the term "soft power." For those of you unfamiliar with the term, soft power is when other countries want what another country wants. In regards to China, soft power would be reflected when other countries want the same thing China wants. No need to threaten or persuade. It's similar to a person having Golden Retriever (without a wagging tail), where a Golden is up to doing anything its owner wants to do (especially playing fetch or eating).

This "soft power" is different from military or economic power (otherwise known as "hard power") in that its sources are cultural attractiveness, political ideology, and activity abroad. Put simply, if other countries like the culture and have good feelings about China, then China will have a lot of soft power. The problem is that measuring soft power is really hard. How does one quantify or qualify cultural attractiveness? The number of movies, pop songs, or Nobel prize awards? Using any of those doesn't quite do the trick, as we don't know how one more movie, pop song, or Nobel prize enhances a country's soft power.

That all said, people are making a big deal about China's "soft power." I'm really skeptical on the subject, especially when everyone agrees that the source of soft power is the attractiveness of culture to foreign audiences; it isn't something that a state can really promote. After all, when you know that a government is trying to shape your opinion, you're more likely to believe the exact opposite of what it is saying. So when I see something like CFR's article on China's soft power, I cringe. It details China's commercial diplomacy more than anything else. Sure, people in Southeast Asia and Pakistan have favorable views of China now, but Southeast Asia definitely has concerns about China in the future. Soft power, like any other type of power, comes and goes. Moreover, because soft power's primary source is culture, it takes a while (say more than a generation) to actually see any payoff. China just really started to focus on soft power in 2006. Little too early to talk about its soft power from my perspective.

In the Western world (including South Korea and Japan), there is still a lot of anxiety surrounding China's intentions. Throw Tiananmen Square and Tibet on top of China's increasing military capabilities and you have a recipe for almost continual suspicion of China. For all the talk about China's "soft power" there really isn't much to it.

The U.S. is still the top dog

Foreign Policy is running an article that I think illustrates American preeminence in the international community. Looking at the list of the 40+ countries and what they want from the United States, it is hard to believe speculation that United States has suffered from a loss of stature within the international community.

My logic (and it may be flawed), is that if the United States was viewed by other states as weaker and not a useful partner (or means) in pursuit of their goals, then fewer countries would be in attendance. Moreover, one wouldn't see the diversity of "wants" when the foreign dignitaries get their time with American officials. Compare this to when foreign officials go to China, economics tends to be the overriding topic of discussion.

However, my logic applies as long as the current international system remains in place. Now how long that will be is a topic of frequent debate within political science, meaning that there is no firm answer. The problem in defining a specific period of time in which another state (read China) could be the dominant power within an international system is that what we know today is more defined than ever before in history. In no time prior to post-WWII has the international community had the breadth and depth of cooperation it has today. One only needs to look at the United Nations, World Bank, IMF, and the G20 to gain a sense of the interdependency. The United States lies at the heart of each of those bodies (the G20 less so than the other 3). For China to edge the United States out of its supremacy would be no small feat and would require lots of time (50+ years). It could be even longer if the international community does not share the same values of China.

So for those of you who doubt American influence, sorry to pop your bubble of depression (or joy depending on your feelings of American supremacy). The world still revolves around the U.S.

Update on China-Taiwan FTA

Looks like Taiwan and China will be signing an FTA this June according to The Washington Post. I look forward to reading the document, as whatever wording is used to address Beijing and Taipei could possibly be used in a future peace treaty between the two parties.

Besides a warming of relations with Beijing, the FTA will also open doors to similar agreements with other countries, notably Asean members. The United States will want to ink one as well, knowing that Beijing won't protest since it signed one with Taipei first. If I was an American government official, I'd certainly want to get it done within a couple of years to maintain (if not increase) trade and hence American influence in Taiwan. Why do you ask?

Quite simply the China-Taiwan FTA will either maintain or increase Taiwan's dependency on Chinese trade, potentially providing Beijing with additional leverage over the island. The United States may not yet be ready for Taiwan to assume a closer orbit around the mainland, therefore having an FTA with Taipei would at the very least maintain the status quo.

Is that a good policy? Depends on who you ask. However the U.S. government will find it increasingly difficult over time to maintain the status quo, especially considering China's military modernization. The U.S. would be hard pressed to sell F-18s or nuclear submarines to the island, which are fast becoming the most basic armaments in the U.S. military. Economically, China is likely to maintain annual GDP growth over 8% for the next several years and could easily show favoritism to Taiwanese companies in an effort to limit America's options.

I understand that kicking the can is always the preferable policy decision when confronting lose-lose scenarios. However I can't help but wonder if U.S. Taiwan policy will soon face a rather large wall.

Singing in the Strait

While this kid can sing well, I highly doubt that the song will become Taiwan's policy towards China any time soon.